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Abstract
This paper studies whether and how strategy revision opportunities affect levels of 
collusion in indefinitely repeated two-player games. Consistent with standard theory, 
we find that such opportunities do not affect strategy choices, or collusion levels, if 
the game is of strategic substitutes. In games of strategic complements, by contrast, 
revision opportunities lead to more collusion. We discuss alternative explanations 
for this result.
Keywords Strategy revision opportunities · Cooperation · Repeated games · 
Complements versus substitutes
JEL Classification C73 · C92 · D43
1 Introduction
Strategy revision opportunities describe possibilities for players to change a strat-
egy during the play of a repeated game. The role of strategy revision opportunities 
is somewhat of a conundrum for economists. From a theory perspective, strategy 
revision opportunities should not affect behaviour, since behaviour strategies, which 
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allow full flexibility during the course of play, and mixtures over strategies chosen at 
the start of the game are seen as equivalent in games of perfect recall (Kuhn 1953; 
Aumann 1964). Any revision a decision-maker may want to make to a strategy dur-
ing the course of play can be encoded in a suitably specified mixed strategy as long 
as arbitrarily complex strategies are allowed. As soon as there is some limit to the 
complexity (number of states) of strategies, revision opportunities could become 
important.
While standard subgame perfect equilibria are unaffected by revision oppor-
tunities, there are two types of considerations that can give some role to revision 
opportunities. One such refinement is renegotiation proofness. While renegotiation 
proofness implies that revision opportunities cannot increase collusion—since with 
revision opportunities players may not be able to credibly commit to the required 
punishment paths—weak renegotiation proofness, for example, has no bite in oli-
gopoly games (Farrell 2000; Aramendia et al. 2005). Another consideration is mis-
coordination, which could play an important role given the large number of possible 
equilibria in indefinitely repeated oligopoly games.
In this paper we conduct a laboratory experiment to study the impact of strategy 
revision opportunities on strategy choices and levels of collusion. This experimen-
tal approach enables us to elicit information about the strategies participants use in 
the repeated game, allowing us to identify strategy revisions and observe intended 
behavior off the realized outcome path. Such data is crucial to understand the mech-
anisms through which revision opportunities affect collusive behavior, and typically 
would be impossible to obtain from field data. Our experiment systematically varies 
revision opportunities across treatments, while keeping other factors such as the tim-
ing of moves, the available strategy sets, the size of the stakes, the number of players 
and the incentives to deviate or cooperate constant.
In the experiment, participants play an indefinitely repeated game where the stage 
game is either a game of strategic substitutes or of strategic complements. The stage 
games are derived from linear duopoly games (Cournot and Bertrand, respectively) 
and reduced to symmetric, normal-form games in which both players have four 
actions to choose from. The demand systems and action sets are chosen so that the 
resulting payoff matrices are as close as possible: they have identical diagonal ele-
ments (including the collusion and Nash outcomes), as well as identical temptation 
and sucker payoffs. The games primarily differ in the location of the (myopic) best 
response to collusion. In the substitutes game, the best response to collusion is less 
cooperative than the Nash action, while in the complements game it is more coop-
erative than the Nash action.
At the beginning of a supergame, participants program a strategy by choosing 
an initial action choice and a dynamic response machine, which specifies a recom-
mended action in response to their rival’s previous action choice. Three treatment 
variations change the degree to which strategy revisions are possible. These vari-
ations are labeled the baseline, unilateral and bilateral variations. In the baseline 
treatment participants cannot change their dynamic response machine; that is, they 
lack revision possibilities. Under the unilateral variation, unilateral changes are pos-
sible, while under the bilateral variation mutual consent is required to change one’s 
dynamic response. The unilateral variation allows for full revision opportunities, 
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while the bilateral variation is designed to mimic orchestrated revisions, such as 
those covered by renegotiation theory. In all variations, participants can deviate 
from their recommendation using one-shot deviations—these deviations come at a 
small cost.1 A machine revision allows participants to economize on such costs in 
future choices.
We find that the existence of revision opportunities has no effect on cooperation 
under strategic substitutes, yet has a significant, positive effect under strategic com-
plements. The second effect is large enough to reverse the ranking of collusion rates 
between interaction types: there is more cooperation under strategic substitutes if 
revision possibilities are absent, while the opposite is true if unilateral revisions are 
possible. Neither standard risk dominance nor considerations of renegotiation can 
explain these results. Given the large multiplicity of equilibria in these games, it 
is intuitive that fear of miscoordination might play an important role. We define a 
notion of “fear of miscoordination”, based on minmax regret, and show that it yields 
predictions consistent with our main results on the effect of revision opportunities.
Our paper contributes mainly to two literatures: (1) literature on strategy revision 
opportunities and (2) the literature on cooperation in games of strategic substitutes 
and complements.
There is not much research on strategy revision opportunities per se, but there is 
some experimental literature on cooperation/collusion that explicitly investigates the 
role of communication and renegotiation. Fonseca and Normann (2012), Andersson 
and Wengström (2012) or Cooper and Kühn (2014), for example, study renegotia-
tion with communication and find mixed results as to whether communication, and 
the timing of communication, leads to more collusion or not. Our setting and results 
provide insight into renegotiation when explicit communication is not possible.2
A seminal study on cooperation in games of strategic substitutes and comple-
ments was conducted by Potters and Suetens (2009). They find more cooperation 
when actions exhibit strategic complementarities. As all their treatments are within 
a framework of behavior strategies, their results are best compared to our unilat-
eral variations where strategy revision is possible. Our results with strategy revision 
opportunities confirm theirs. However, without revision opportunities, we find the 
opposite is true: there is more collusion with strategic substitutes. We discuss the 
intuition behind these differences in detail in Sect. 4.
Finally, our results also relate to the experimental literature on indefinitely 
repeated games. Usually this literature either elicits strategies without revision pos-
sibilities (Selten et  al. 1997; Dal Bó and Fréchette 2017) or lets subjects play the 
game in a “hot” setting without eliciting strategies (Dal Bó 2005; Casari and Camera 
2009). Our results show that which setting is chosen can potentially affect behavior, 
1 This possibility is included so that participants have the full strategy space of the repeated game avail-
able.
2 Note that the theory of renegotiation does not require any explicit communication between players. 
However, it does require both players willingness to change strategies. Our bilateral treatment provides a 
minimal signal (that is, allowing the other player to modify their machine) of willingness to “renegotiate” 
the current path of play.
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at least when the game is one of strategic complements. One exception is Mengel 
and Peeters (2011), who have a “semi-hot” treatment (hot but with small costs) and 
a treatment without revision opportunities in a study comparing contributions by 
partners and strangers in a repeated public good game. Their setting is not suita-
ble to study strategy revisions, however, since, although participants are allowed to 
deviate from pre-programmed strategies in some treatments, they are not allowed to 
revise strategies.
The paper is organized as follows: Sect. 2 outlines the experimental design and 
experimental procedures. Section 3 establishes our primary empirical results, in par-
ticular that revision opportunities have a positive effect under strategic complements 
and that this effect is large enough to reverse the ranking of collusion rates between 
the interaction types. Section 4 provides a discussion of the alternative explanations 
for our results, and formalises the concept of fear of miscoordination. A final section 
concludes.
2  The experiment
Designing experiments to understand strategic behaviour in indefinitely repeated 
games has two principal challenges. The first is the well-known theoretical problem 
of characterising the entire set of equilibrium strategies. The second concerns the 
complexity to directly elicit strategies due to the size and complexity of the strat-
egy space, and constraints on participants’ time, cognitive abilities and experience. 
Related to this second challenge, the existing experimental literature has usually lim-
ited the strategy space considerably in order to do so (Dal Bó and Fréchette 2017). 
Such an approach has clear consequences for studying strategy revision opportuni-
ties since, under a restricted strategy space, the equivalence of behaviour and mixed 
strategies can break down. On the other hand, the impossibility to encode everything 
into a mixed strategy is one of the primary reasons why revision opportunities may 
matter in many real-life situations of interest.
Our design resolves these tensions by restricting participants to program a unit-
recall dynamic response, but allowing them to deviate from the action proposed by 
the response to make available the full strategy space in all treatments. The experi-
ment then studies revision opportunities in a 3 × 2 design with three levels of strat-
egy revision opportunities and two types of strategic interaction.
2.1  Design
The two stage games. Participants play one of two possible games in Fig. 1 that dif-
fer in the type of strategic interaction: strategic substitutes or strategic complements. 
Payoffs are in experimental currency units (ECU), which are converted to Euros at 
the end of the experiment.
The structure and payoffs of the games are designed so that, while each game has 
a natural duopoly analogue, the two are as identical as possible. To provide this ana-
logue, the substitutes game is a discretized version of a differentiated-goods linear 
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Cournot duopoly and the complements game is a discretized version of a differenti-
ated-goods linear Bertrand duopoly. In both cases, the duopolists produce differen-
tiated-goods that are product substitutes. To ensure a fair comparison across games, 
the underlying duopoly games were calibrated so that the majority of payoffs for key 
action pairs are identical across games:
1. the Nash equilibrium payoffs ( 휋Nash ) that result from both players playing action 
C are identical.
2. the joint payoff maximizing payoffs ( 휋Collusion ) that result from both choosing 
action A are identical.
3. the optimal deviation against the co-player playing action A, which requires play-
ing action B in the complements game and action D in the substitutes game, yields 
the same payoff ( 휋Dev ) for the defector and the sucker across games.
4. the remaining actions in the games, action D for the complements game and action 
B for the substitutes game, are such that all diagonal elements are identical across 
games.3
Sustaining cooperation via trigger strategies requires
to be satisfied. All the payoff parameters involved in this inequality are the same 
for both our complements and substitutes variations.4 As a consequence of these 
choices, the minimal discount factor needed to sustain collusion via trigger strate-
gies is the same in both games ( 훿min = 0.8077 ) and the chosen continuation prob-
ability of 훿 = 7∕8 is above this level.
The crucial difference between the two games is the location of the optimal 
deviation against the co-player playing the joint payoff maximizing action, which 
is action B with strategic complements and action D with strategic substitutes. For 
1
1−훿
휋
Collusion ≥ 휋Dev +
훿
1−훿
휋
Nash
A B C D
A 43, 43 31, 51 25, 52 23, 54
B 51, 31 36, 36 32, 40 29, 38
C 52, 25 40, 32 33, 33 31, 32
D 54, 23 38, 29 32, 31 30, 30
Strategic substitutes.
A B C D
A 43, 43 23, 54 14, 52 7, 47
B 54, 23 36, 36 32, 40 28, 37
C 52, 14 40, 32 33, 33 31, 32
D 47, 7 37, 28 32, 31 30, 30
Strategic complements.
Fig. 1  The two stage games in the experiment
3 After rounding the payoffs to numbers, one unit of payoff was changed to some payoffs in order to 
avoid degeneracies that are caused by rounding. This is done in such a way that games become even 
more similar: for instance, this led to the box formed by actions B and C and that formed by actions C 
and D being identical across games. See Section A of the supplementary materials for the underlying 
demand systems of the two games, as well as a description of the process that generated the discretized 
versions.
4 The same is also true for other collusive strategies, such as tit-for-tat. While such strategies are not sub-
game perfect, they can be implemented without one-shot deviations or machine changes.
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convenience, we will refer to the actions A, B, C and D as respectively Collusion, 
Dev.SC, Nash and Dev.SS.
Repeated game strategies. At the beginning of a repeated game, participants are 
asked to specify an intended strategy. This strategy consists of an initial action, 
to be played in the first stage, and a programmed machine, which recommends at 
each later stage an action conditional on their co-player’s action in the previous 
stage. The machine is denoted by a quadruple zAzBzCzD specifying which action 
zk ∈ {A,B,C,D} the machine is programmed to play if the opponent has chosen 
action k ∈ {A,B,C,D} in the previous stage. An intended strategy is denoted by 
z� − zAzBzCzD , where the first element refers to the initial action choice.
The most general strategy one can formulate in a repeated game maps any pos-
sible history of observed action profiles into actions. In this design, however, par-
ticipants’ intended strategies are restricted so that actions can only be conditioned 
on their co-player’s action in the previous stage. Some examples of familiar strate-
gies that can be programmed are: unconditional cooperation (A–AAAA), tit-for-tat 
(A–ABCD), (forgiving) Nash reversion (A–ACCC), and always Nash (C–CCCC). 
Also strategies such as myopic best responses can be programmed. A well-known 
machine that cannot be programmed is grim-trigger. The ACCC-machine that 
comes closest implements a forgiving grim-trigger; that is, it reverts to cooperation 
if the opponent chooses to cooperate in some stage following a deviation.
While the focus is on simple strategies with few states and hence lower com-
plexity, we allow participants to play other strategies as well. In particular, in all 
treatments participants are allowed to take an action that differs from the one recom-
mended by their machine. Such changes are referred to as one-shot deviations. Con-
sequently, more general strategies, such as grim-trigger, become feasible to imple-
ment via one-shot deviations.5 These trigger strategy can be used to sustain collusion 
for all discount rates above the 훿min calculated earlier for the standard repeated game 
(i.e. just action choices in each period).6
To provide participants with an incentive to program their machines (strategies) 
carefully, one-shot deviations are costly. Each one-shot deviation costs 3 ECU. 
Hence, we expect participants to rely mostly on unit recall strategies. However, if 
participants have strong enough preferences to choose another strategy, the full strat-
egy space is available for participants in all treatments.
Revision opportunities. There are no revision opportunities in the treatments 
labeled baseline. Here, participants keep their machines for the entire duration of the 
repeated game, and can only deviate from the recommendations of their machines 
5 Even though one-shot deviations have not been used a lot during the experiments (see Table 2), the 
machine AAAA (unconditional cooperation) accounts for a large majority of the instances in which they 
were used. Conditional on using AAAA the frequency of one-shot deviations is 58 or 77% in the substi-
tutes and complements variations of the baseline treatment, respectively. For all other machines the fre-
quency is below 10% . While these one-shot deviations came from very few participants and hence should 
be interpreted with care, they were used exclusively to play Nash or to punish, where the punishment 
action coincides with the myopic best response in the case of strategic substitutes.
6 See Section B of the supplementary materials for details.
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via one-shot deviations. In the unilateral treatments strategy revisions are possible. 
Participants can modify their machines after any stage of the repeated game.
To provide participants with an incentive to program their machines (strategies) 
carefully, machine modifications also have a small cost associated with them. In par-
ticular each machine modification costs 1 ECU, irrespective of the number of ele-
ments of the machine that are changed. Choosing the costs in such a manner we 
hoped to ensure that playing with a poorly programmed strategy is more costly in 
the baseline (where one needs to rely on one-shot deviations) than with unilateral 
revision opportunities (where machine changes are possible).
Again, collusive equilibria can be supported for all discount rates above 훿min using 
the same trigger strategy (A–ACCC) as in the baseline, which only relies on one-
shot deviations to ensure permanent Nash reversion—see Section B.3 of the supple-
mentary materials for further details.7 Under the third variation—labeled bilateral—
participants can modify their machines if and only if consent to a modification has 
been given by their opponent.
2.2  Procedures
The experiment was conducted in the BEElab at Maastricht University during Octo-
ber–December 2011. 288 students were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner 2015) and 
participated in one of the six treatments.8 For each of our treatments we have six 
independent observations. During each session, three matching groups were run in 
parallel on separate z-Tree servers (Fischbacher 2007). Sessions lasted an hour and 
a half on average, including a twenty minute instruction period. On average partici-
pants earned between 12.60 and 15.30 Euro for their participation.
For each treatment six matching groups were run. Each matching group com-
prised eight participants that all played the repeated game (of the same treatment) 
ten times. At the beginning of a match, as a single repeated game is referred to, 
participants within a matching group were randomly paired. At the end of a ses-
sion, participants were paid in cash according to the amount of ECUs they earned 
in one randomly drawn match. Table 2 gives the number of observations for each 
treatment.
Participants were fully informed about all details of the decision task, the envi-
ronment and procedures in the experimental instructions (see Section C of the sup-
plementary materials for an example of the instructions). Participants were never 
informed of the machine employed by other participants, but instead observed the 
7 That behavior is not unduly affected by the small cost imposed on these deviations is also shown 
empirically using a hot variation, where both the costs of machine changes and one-shot deviations 
were set to zero. See Embrey et al. (2016) for details of this treatment, where the use of such dynamic 
response machines to elicit strategies in repeated games is described, along with a detailed investigation 
of the elicited strategies for the more commonly implemented environment with revision opportunities.
8 Other than the treatments mentioned we did not conduct any additional treatments. We conducted one 
pilot session with a 6 × 6 game (and some other differences in design), after which we decided to switch 
to a 4 × 4 game to reduce complexity for participants and hence the duration of the experiment.
 M. Embrey et al.
1 3
history of play. That is, after every stage they were informed of their own action and 
the action of the person they were matched with, as well as the resulting payoffs.
For all members in a matching group, any given match consisted of the same 
number of stages, but this number changed across matches. Across matching groups 
this sequence of match-lengths differed. However, to facilitate comparison between 
treatments, the sequences were generated at random upfront and the same sequences 
were used for the different matching groups of each treatment. Table  1 provides 
details on the sequence of match lengths for the different matching groups.
3  Results
Table 2 provides a summary of the six treatments. In general participants had diffi-
culty establishing more cooperative behavior, capturing on average less than 25% of 
the potential gains from cooperating in all treatments. The treatments with strategic 
Table 1  Number of stages 
played in the ten matches for the 
six different matching groups
Match-
ing 
group
Match Total
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 13 8 1 4 1 5 20 7 8 2 69
2 1 4 3 4 15 18 15 6 2 2 70
3 10 10 10 8 3 2 2 13 11 12 81
4 9 5 8 10 9 4 12 12 18 4 91
5 2 1 9 14 15 14 3 8 20 6 92
6 6 4 6 8 3 11 8 26 19 7 98
Table 2  Summary of treatments
Efficiency = 100 ×
( average stage game payoff−휋Nash
휋JPM −휋Nash
)
 , where the stage game payoff is averaged over all matches 
and all stages. The column 1-shot deviations shows the percentage of stage games in which one-shot 
deviations were observed and the column “Machine” shows the percentage of stage games in which 
machine changes are observed
Match. 
groups
Num. subj. Num. 
matches
Num. 
stages 
per match 
(avg.)
Efficiency 
(%)
Deviations
1-Shot (%) Machine (%)
Substitutes
Baseline 1–6 48 10 8.35 17.6 9.6
Bilateral 1–6 48 10 8.35 16.9 10.5 0.2
Unilateral 1–6 48 10 8.35 16.5 6.5 3.7
Complements
Baseline 1–6 48 10 8.35 10.9 5.1
Bilateral 1–6 48 10 8.35 10.1 6.8 0.4
Unilateral 1–6 48 10 8.35 23.2 5.1 3.0
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complements provided both the least and the most cooperative behavior, with low 
levels of cooperation in the baseline and bilateral treatments and high levels in the 
unilateral treatment. In all treatments, participants incurred very low costs for devi-
ating from or modifying their machines. One-shot deviations are observed in less 
than 11% of stage games. In the unilateral treatments, machine modifications were 
implemented after less than 4% of stage games, while in the bilateral treatment (in 
which mutual agreement was required), machine modifications were made after less 
than 1% of stage games.
The majority of the subsequent analysis uses data from the last third of a session 
(matches 7–10). This sub-sample provides a reasonable trade-off between using the 
final matches, where subject behavior is most likely to have converged, and ensur-
ing enough observations. Only when analysing the evolution of behavior across 
matches, or behavior in particular histories for which there is the need to expand the 
sample size, we increase the sub-sample to data from the last two-thirds of a session 
(matches 4–10). In terms of stages we use only data from stages twelve or earlier. 
The reason is that later stages did not exist in each match for each matching group 
(see Table 1). All reported regressions and statistical tests use cluster-robust stand-
ard errors, corrected for arbitrary correlation at the matching-group level (see Sec-
tion E.3 of the supplementary materials for robustness checks using matching-group 
averages and non-parametric statistics).
3.1  Impact of revision opportunities on cooperation
We consider two measures of cooperation. The primary measure is the actual sur-
plus generated over and above the one-shot Nash equilibrium as a percentage of the 
maximum available surplus (efficiency). This measure aggregates the impact of all 
choices, including partial collusion and deviation choices. The secondary measure 
focusses on just the percent of (full) collusion choices by subjects.
Figure  2 shows the evolution of efficiency both across matches and within 
matches. As can be seen, across matches (Panel a) revision opportunities do not 
seem to affect first-stage efficiency with strategic substitutes while there is a clear 
separation of the unilateral variation from the other two conditions with strategic 
complements. All treatments show the same pattern of decline of efficiency across 
stages within matches (Panel b).
A linear regression on efficiency is used to formally quantify the effect of 
strategy revision opportunities and to understand statistical significance. Table 3 
reports the results of this analysis separately for strategic substitutes and comple-
ments. In columns (1) and (3), a complete set of dummies for the various lev-
els of revision opportunities is interacted with the stage number of the match.9 
This regression confirms the impression that strategy revision opportunities have 
no impact on rates of collusion under strategic substitutes, but have a significant 
9 The regression includes matching-group dummies that control for possible fixed effects resulting from 
the particular draw of the number of stages in each match. See Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3 of the supplemen-
tary materials for a series of robustness checks for these regressions.
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impact under strategic complements. With strategic complements, the unilateral 
variation is associated with significantly higher rates of collusion (column (3)), 
while the baseline and bilateral variation have statistically similar rates. Note 
also that the R2 is substantially higher for the complements variation, arguably 
because revision opportunities can explain more of the observed variation in this 
setting.
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Fig. 2  The effect of strategy revision opportunities on efficiency with strategic complements and substi-
tutes. a Efficiency across matches. b Efficiency within matches
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Columns (2) and (4), expand the specification to include the match number as 
a dependent variable. Doing so reveals that strategy revision opportunities also 
work through the dynamics across matches. These regressions also show significant 
effects for the bilateral variation in the treatments with strategic complements. Here 
the mean is about the same as in the baseline but the dynamics are quite different, 
as can be seen in column (4). These patterns are most easily seen in Figure E.1 of 
the supplementary materials, which graphs the predicted efficiency from the linear 
regression.
Figure 3 shows the evolution of choices for the collusive action over time. Panel 
(a) shows this time trend across matches for choices in the first stage. With strategic 
substitutes (left panel), initial stage collusive choices are increasing over matches 
for the baseline and unilateral variations, while no clear trend is seen when bilat-
eral consent is needed to modify machines. An obvious ranking of levels of revision 
opportunities, on the extent to which it generates collusion, cannot be made on the 
basis of this graph. With strategic complements (right panel), the graph illustrates 
a clear separation of treatments. Collusion rates are highest under unilateral. Under 
the baseline and bilateral variations, collusion rates are lower. There is a trend for 
collusion rates to increase over time in the unilateral treatment. However, no such 
trend is evident for the other treatments. Panel (b) of Fig. 3 shows how the rates of 
collusion change within a match. It displays the typical pattern of collusion decreas-
ing sharply after the first few stages, then remaining approximately constant at a 
lower level. A logit regression using choice of action A as the dependent variable 
can be found in Table E.4 of the supplementary materials. The results of the logit 
Table 3  Linear regression of payoff efficiency in the stage game
The baseline case is the baseline treatment. All regressions use data from matches 7–10 and stages 1–12 
and include match-stage composition dummies. All regressions have 2352 observations across 18 match-
ing groups (clusters). VCE clustered at the matching-group level. p values are reported in parentheses. 
***1%, **5%, *10% significance
Substitutes Complements
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Bilateral − 0.06 (0.477) 0.08 (0.381) −  0.05 (0.392) −  0.18* (0.063)
Unilateral −  0.03 (0.745) 0.02 (0.837) 0.19*** (0.003) 0.06 (0.294)
Stage −  0.02*** (0.000) −  0.01*** (0.000) −  0.01** (0.040) −  0.01** (0.044)
Bilateral × stage −  0.00 (0.765) −  0.00 (0.551) 0.01 (0.148) 0.01 (0.105)
Unilateral × stage 0.00 (0.730) 0.00 (0.804) −  0.01 (0.389) −  0.00 (0.517)
Match 0.06*** (0.001) −  0.00 (0.997)
Bilateral × match −  0.05* (0.061) 0.05** (0.023)
Unilateral × 
match
−  0.02 (0.528) 0.05** (0.010)
Constant 0.36*** (0.000) 0.21*** (0.000) 0.11** (0.012) 0.12*** (0.009)
R2 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.12
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regression show the same qualitative patterns in terms of treatment comparisons as 
the OLS regressions on efficiency shown in Table 3.
To sum up, we find that with strategic substitutes, strategy revision opportuni-
ties do not affect average collusion, while with strategic complements, strategy 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
4 6 8 10 4 6 8 10
Substitutes Complements
Baseline Bilateral Unilateral
Pe
rc
en
t C
ol
lu
sio
n 
Ch
oi
ce
 in
 F
irs
t S
ta
ge
Match
Data from matches 4−10 and stages 1−12.
(a)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2 4 6 8 10 12 2 4 6 8 10 12
Substitutes Complements
Baseline Bilateral Unilateral
Pe
rc
en
t C
ol
lu
sio
n 
Ch
oi
ce
Stage
Data from matches 7−10 and stages 1−12.
(b)
Fig. 3  The effect of strategy revision opportunities on collusion with strategic substitutes and comple-
ments: percentage of collusion. a Collusion choice across matches. b Collusion choice within matches
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revision opportunities have a positive effect on collusion. This conclusion is 
based on the following Result:
Result 1 (1) Under strategic substitutes there is no treatment difference in average 
efficiency or collusion rates across the baseline, unilateral and bilateral variations. 
(2) Under strategic complements average efficiency as well as average collusion 
rates are higher under the unilateral compared to the other variations.
3.2  Difference between complements and substitutes
Strategy revision opportunities also affect the comparison between complements 
and substitutes. With fewer or no revision opportunities there is more collusion with 
strategic substitutes than with strategic complements: 35.2 versus 19.6% for first 
stage choice under the baseline variation (p value = 0.08 ), and 35.4 versus 14.6% 
under the bilateral variation (p value < 0.01).10 However, with revision opportuni-
ties there is more collusion with strategic complements: 36.5 versus 43.5% (p value 
= 0.07 ) under the unilateral variation.
This strategic interaction effect is further quantified using analogous regression 
specifications to those reported in Table 3, except the data from both game types 
Table 4  Linear regression of payoff efficiency in the stage game—strategic substitutes versus comple-
ments
The baseline case is the baseline treatment with strategic substitutes. All regressions use data from 
matches 7–10 and stages 1–12 and include match-stage composition dummies. Both regressions have 
4704 observations across 18 matching groups (clusters). VCE clustered at the matching-group level. 
p-values are reported in parentheses. ***1%, **5%, *10% significance. The table reports just the results 
for regressors involving the complements dummy variable plus the constant term; see Table E.5 of the 
supplementary materials for the complete output
Combined regression
(1) (2)
Complements −  0.15** (0.044) 0.02 (0.791)
Complements × bilateral 0.01 (0.927) −  0.27** (0.036)
Complements × unilateral 0.22** (0.040) 0.04 (0.770)
Complements × stage 0.00 (0.668) 0.00 (0.885)
Complements × bilateral × stage 0.01 (0.188) 0.02* (0.092)
Complements × unilateral × stage −  0.01 (0.360) −  0.01 (0.503)
Complements × match −  0.07*** (0.005)
Complements × bilateral × match 0.11*** (0.002)
Complements × unilateral × match 0.07* (0.078)
Constant 0.31*** (0.000) 0.16*** (0.007)
R2 0.05 0.07
10 See Table E.10 of the supplementary materials for a complete set of comparisons across game types.
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are pooled and additional dependent variables are added – a strategic complements 
indicator interacted with the levels of revisions opportunities and stage and with the 
level of revision opportunities and match. Table 4 reports the results of this exer-
cise.11 The results show that in the baseline treatment, average payoff efficiency is 
higher under substitutes as illustrated by the negative coefficient on the comple-
ments dummy in column (1) (p value 0.044). In the unilateral treatment, by contrast, 
payoff efficiency is higher under complements, as shown by the sum of coefficients 
on “complements” and “complements × unilateral” (p value 0.073). These results 
also confirm the overall message, with respect to the comparison across game types 
that is visible in Fig. 2. Namely, there is a significant effect of the type of strate-
gic interaction on the development of collusion across matches. The development of 
collusion within a match is comparable across game types.
Result 2 With revision opportunities (unilateral) there is (weakly) more collusion in 
first-stage choices and (weakly) higher average payoff efficiency with strategic com-
plements. Without revision opportunities (baseline) there is (weakly) more collusion 
in first-stage choices and (weakly) higher average payoff efficiency with strategic 
substitutes.
3.3  Individual behavior
The previous subsections dealt with the impact of revision opportunities and the 
type of strategic interaction by assessing outcomes along the realized path of play. 
To understand further what drives these realized paths, this subsection analyses 
individuals’ intended strategies. To this end, Table  5 gives the distribution of the 
machines programmed at the beginning of matches 7–10, along with a breakdown of 
the initial choices associated with each machine.
In principle there are 256 different machines—that is, the dynamic response part 
of the intended strategy—that participants could use. However, only seven types 
were used with a frequency of at least 5 percent in at least one of the treatments.12 
These prominent types of machine seem reasonable, with the majority correspond-
ing to strategies that are commonly seen either in prior experimental studies or 
from the theory of repeated games. The first four—AAAA, ABC(C/D), ACCC and 
BBCC—attempt to establish some collusion, either unconditionally or condition-
ally.13 Of the non-cooperative machines, there is the static Nash machine (CCCC), 
11 See Table  E.6 of the supplementary materials for the analogous analysis using the probability of 
choosing the collusive action.
12 20–36 percent of programmed machines do not fall into one of the seven prominent categories. 
Table  E.7 in the supplementary materials decomposes this “Other” category to show that the seven 
prominent machines give a fair characterization: many machines categorized as “Other” in Table 5 are 
minor deviations from these. Using this decomposition, the “Other” category drops to 6–19 percent.
13 AAAA is unconditional cooperation, ABCD is tit-for-tat or also imitation (Apesteguia et  al. 2007), 
ACCC is Nash reversion and BBCC could be interpreted as cautious or partial cooperation.
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the myopic best response machine (DCCC under substitutes and BCCC under com-
plements) and the punishing machine (DDDD).
The treatment comparisons in Table 5 mirror those seen in the data from the real-
ized path of play. Under strategic substitutes there is no consistent effect of revision 
opportunities on intended strategies. In particular, there is no significant difference 
between the baseline treatment and the unilateral treatment in the likelihood of pro-
gramming a collusive dynamic response—that is, either responding cooperatively 
to the other player having played A (40 vs. 35%; p value = 0.520) or to the other 
Table 5  Distribution of initial choice and machine categories (in percent)
Distribution of prominent machines programmed at the beginning of matches 7–10 (in bold), along with 
a breakdown of the prominent initial choices associated with each machine (in italics). Machine combi-
nations that were used with a frequency below 5 percent in every treatment are categorized as “Other”. 
A cooperative response to A is any machine that chooses A in response A; a cooperative response to B is 
any that chooses A or B in response to B; a punishing response to the deviation action is any that chooses 
D in response to D under substitutes and D in response to B under complements
Prominent Strategy Substitutes Complements
Machine category Initial-machine Base Bil Uni Base Bil Uni
Unconditional cooperation AAAA 1 1 5 1 1 8
A- 1 1 5 0 1 8
Conditional cooperation ABC(C/D) 18 16 11 10 18 23
A- 12 8 6 6 6 19
B- 1 2 2 2 6 4
Nash reversion ACCC 12 16 7 16 5 12
A- 10 13 7 12 2 12
Partial collusion + Nash rev. BBCC 1 2 2 5 7 1
B- 0 0 1 4 6 1
Nash CCCC 17 10 22 22 26 14
C- 11 9 14 21 19 13
Myopic best reponse DCCC 16 12 19
C- 7 4 7
D- 7 7 11
BCCC 25 21 15
B- 5 10 10
C- 17 10 4
Punishing DDDD 0 7 3 0 0 0
D- 0 7 3 0 0 0
Other ——– 35 36 31 20 22 27
All machines with a ...
Cooperative response to action A 40 48 35 33 30 52
Cooperative response to action B 28 28 29 22 33 39
Deviation response (D/B) to action A 31 33 38 35 35 32
Punishing response to deviation (D/B) 22 37 23 3 2 4
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player having played B (28 vs. 29%; p value = 0.785).14 Indeed the only significant 
difference under substitutes is that subjects are more likely to respond cooperatively 
to action A with bilateral revision opportunities than unilateral ones. This more col-
lusive response under bilateral is counter-balanced by a greater use of punishing 
responses, especially after the other player has played the deviation action (although 
in isolation this difference between bilateral and unilateral, 37 vs. 23%, is not signifi-
cantly different, p value = 0.125).
By contrast, revision opportunities have a significant and positive effect on the 
cooperativeness of intended strategies under strategic complements. In the unilateral 
treatment, subjects are significantly more likely to respond in a collusive manner 
after the other player chose A than in both the baseline (52 vs. 33%; p value = 0.019) 
and the bilateral (52 vs. 30%; p value < 0.001 ) treatments. In addition, subjects are 
also more likely to respond with a collusive action after action B in the unilateral 
than in the baseline treatment (39 vs. 22%; p value = 0.012). As seen in Table 5, 
intended strategies are generally composed of the “intuitive” initial choice to go 
with the chosen machine. Furthermore, as seen in Figs. 2 and 3, stage-one choices 
and efficiency respond strongly to the change in revision opportunities under strate-
gic complements.15
Result 3 (1) With strategic substitutes, strategy revision opportunities have no clear 
effect on intended strategies. (2) With strategic complements, strategy revision 
opportunities lead to an increase in the use of more cooperative dynamic responses.
In summary, strategic complementarity appears to induce more collusive out-
comes when players have the opportunity to revise their initial intended strategies 
for two reasons. The first, and most direct effect, is that intended strategies are 
more collusive, both in terms of more efficient initial choices and more cooperative 
dynamic responses. However, there is a second reinforcing effect in how participants 
respond to myopic best response actions (action B under strategic complements and 
action D under strategic substitutes), which is revealed by the numbers in the bottom 
part of Table 5. The myopic best response action triggers a punishing response in 
22–37% of the cases under strategic substitutes and in only 2–4% of the cases under 
strategic complements. Under complements, a participant playing the myopic best 
response is still quite likely to iterate to at least a partially cooperative outcome; 
15 These observations lead to the question of whether this effect of revision opportunities is driven 
entirely by initial choice. Since our experimental design collects data on both the realized path of play 
and intended strategies, it is possible to analyse the role of such path dependency. This analysis is 
reported in Section D of the supplementary materials (see Mengel and Peeters 2011, for an earlier exam-
ple of such analysis). In summary, both initial choices and dynamic responses appear to be important.
14 These p values are based on a linear random-effects regression on revision-opportunities treatment 
dummies. The p values quoted in this and the subsequent paragraphs are based on analogous tests. See 
Table  E.11 of the supplementary materials for a complete set of pairwise tests for the four summary 
statistics reported at the bottom of Table 5, as well as the p values obtained via a non-parametric test on 
matching-group averages that were run as a robustness check.
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under substitutes, such a strategy most likely instigates a spiral towards a Nash or 
punishment outcome.
4  Discussion
Our primary result is that, while strategy revision opportunities have no effect on 
collusion under strategic substitutes, they have a significant positive effect under 
strategic complements. What could explain the role of revision opportunities, given 
that the standard prediction from game theory suggests it should play no role? In 
what follows, we discuss two popular concepts from the theoretical and experimen-
tal literature on repeated games (see, for example, Farrell and Maskin 1989; Fonseca 
and Normann 2012; Blonski et al. 2011; Dal Bó and Fréchette 2011). Neither will be 
able to provide a satisfactory explanation for our results. We define a notion of fear 
of miscoordination that yields predictions in line with the observed effect of chang-
ing the availability of revision opportunities.
4.1  Renegotiation
The observed ranking of collusion rates across treatments goes against the intuition 
delivered by the renegotiation literature. In particular, with fewer revision oppor-
tunities, and hence reduced concerns for renegotiation, we observe less collusion 
under strategic complements.
Although renegotiation should never happen in equilibrium—whether collusion 
is weak renegotiation proof or not—it is reasonable to expect the strategic forces 
that drive the concept would need to be learnt by experience. Consequently, there 
is still the possibility that subjects engaged in something like renegotiation, but that 
such efforts did not feed back into reduced collusion at the beginning of a match. 
We can look at our data from the bilateral treatment to see whether many attempts 
to “renegotiate” were made. Bilateral modifications take place very rarely. In par-
ticular, during matches 7–10 there were only 6 bilateral deviations (out of over 1200 
interactions) with strategic substitutes and 9 with strategic complements from 
respectively 5 and 7 machines. Consequently, there are few instances where partici-
pants succeeded in coordinating on a mutual modification of their machines.
Nonetheless, the data collected on strategic decisions throughout the experiment 
allows some analysis regarding which paths are “renegotiated”, and if so, how. To do 
so, we study when and how machines are (attempted to be) modified conditional on 
the last outcome of the realized path of play. We classify paths into three categories: 
(1) “failed collusion” (outcomes (B,A) and (A,B)), (2) “miscoordination” (from the 
perspective of a cooperative agent; outcomes (A,C), (A,D), (B,C) and (B,D)) and (3) 
“punishment paths” (outcomes (C,D), (D,C) and (D,D)). After a “miscoordination” 
stage, participants mostly try to modify cooperative machines into more punishing 
machines. Along “punishment paths”, participants mostly (want to) modify non-
cooperative machines, but rarely modify them into more collusive machines. Rene-
gotiation theory, though, would say that participants modify punishing machines 
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into more cooperative machines that allow them to leave a punishment stage.16 
Hence, in addition to the treatment comparisons, there is also no direct evidence that 
participants engaged in something like renegotiation.
4.2  Risk‑dominance
Given the large number of possible equilibria in these indefinitely repeated games, it 
seems intuitive that considerations of renegotiation might be overshadowed by con-
cerns of coordination on one of the different equilibria. Hence, it seems reasonable 
to look at risk-dominance, since it gives a role for a fear of equilibrium miscoor-
dination. As discussed in Dal Bó and Fréchette (2011), extending the idea of risk-
dominance to infinitely repeated games poses a number of difficulties, even with 
only two actions for each player. These difficulties include extending the definition 
to repeated-game strategies and the issue that two repeated-game strategies can gen-
erate equivalent outcome paths. To these difficulties, our environment also adds the 
issue of extending the definition of risk dominance to more action choices in the 
stage game.
Blonski et al. (2011) consider an extension of the concept to the repeated prison-
ers’ dilemma that involves only the strategies permanent Nash reversion and static 
Nash. Translating this approach to our environment results in the prediction that 
Nash reversion, with an initial choice of cooperation, is the risk-dominant strategy 
for both types of strategic interaction and all levels of strategy revision opportu-
nities.17 In what follows, we discuss how a definition of fear of miscoordination, 
which does not restrict itself to equilibrium miscoordination, can accommodate the 
observed behavior.
4.3  Fear of miscoordination
Since neither renegotiation nor risk dominance considerations are in line with our 
results, we consider a refinement based on a notion of “fear of miscoordination”. 
Given the large number of possible equilibria in indefinitely repeated games, fear 
of miscoordination seems a particularly relevant concern and its effect may over-
shadow any potential effect of renegotiation. Intuitively, players will be less con-
cerned about mis-coordinating if they have the possibility to revise their strat-
egy during the course of play. Hence fear of miscoordination delivers exactly the 
16 Table E.8 of the supplementary materials provides more details.
17 When focussing only on the Nash reversion and static Nash strategies, there is only one difference 
between the strategic complement and strategic substitute games: the (A,C) payoff in the complements 
game is lower than that in the substitutes game (14 rather than 25). With a discount rate of 7/8 and the 
uniform prior as the belief of the opponent’s strategy, this difference is too small to result in different 
predictions for the risk-dominance concept. One could consider allowing for a non-uniform prior. How-
ever, only a relatively small range of beliefs would result in the static Nash machine being selected in the 
complements game, whereas the Nash reversion machine is selected in the substitutes game. The weight 
on the opponent choosing the static Nash machine would need to be at least 77% and no more than 88%. 
There is no support in the data for such a range of beliefs.
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opposite intuition compared to renegotiation in terms of how revision opportunities 
should affect collusion.
We formalize this idea as follows. For a player i using repeated game strategy s∗
i
 , 
the maximal regret possible for this strategy is given by
FNR is constructed as the difference between the payoff i expects when choosing s∗i  , 
while expecting her opponent to do the same, and the worst possible payoff that 
she could obtain by choosing this strategy. Notice that this definition is formulated 
from the perspective of a symmetric equilibrium in the context of two-player games, 
which is sufficient for the purpose of this study, but not crucial for the result we will 
state below.18 ,19 Equation (1) describes the fear of miscoordination in cases where 
strategy revision is not possible.
To define fear of miscoordination if strategy revision is possible, define a 
sequence of pure strategies (퐬훕
퐢
)
휏=0,...,∞ with the interpretation that at t the action pre-
scribed by st
i
 given the history induced by (퐬훕
퐢
)
휏=0,...,t−1 is chosen. Note that any fixed 
sequence of strategies can simply be expressed as a (potentially very complex) strat-
egy itself and that constant sequences are possible as well. Denote by 퐬 a pair of such 
sequences 퐬 = ((s휏
1
)
휏=0,...,∞, (s
휏
2
)
휏=0,...,∞) and by 훱i(퐬) player i’s discounted average 
payoff under 퐬 . Fear of miscoordination F can then be defined as,
Of course the question arises, why would a player ever want to revise their strategy? 
After all, any situation under which a player would want to make a revision can be 
encoded in initial strategies as we have discussed in the introduction (Kuhn 1953). 
However, such strategies may be relatively complex, for example being automata 
involving many states. If there is any arbitrarily small but fixed cost of using autom-
ata with more states, agents would not want to use these additional states to encod-
ing revisions for zero probability events (that is, histories that they do not expect to 
be reached).
Table 6 shows the level of fear of miscoordination for prominent strategies in our 
main treatments, where “prominent strategies” are those that are used in at least 5% 
of the cases in at least one treatment.20 As can be seen, fear of miscoordination is 
(1)FNR = 훱i(s
∗
i
, s∗
i
) −min
s−i
훱i(s
∗
i
, s−i).
(2)F((퐬
∗)) = 훱i((퐬
∗
퐢
), (퐬∗
퐢
)) −min
(퐬−퐢)
훱i((퐬
∗
퐢
), (퐬−퐢)).
20 The numbers for the strategy A–AAAA under strategic substitutes are derived as follows. In the base-
line treatment, where revision is not possible, a player expects to receive a payoff 43 every stage when 
expecting his opponent to apply the same strategy, while in the worst case he only receives a payoff of 
23 every stage. The fear of miscoordination is here the difference between the present values of these 
18 Defining this notion for all equilibria would require knowledge about which equilibria can be sup-
ported by any given strategy.
19 Chassang (2010) has used fear of miscoordination in a weaker sense. He studies dynamic global 
games and refers to fear of miscoordination as the possibility of miscoordination arising from a lack of 
common knowledge and in particular arbitrarily small amounts of private knowledge. His characteriza-
tion of sequentially rationalizable strategies is related to risk dominance in the one-shot game and thus 
quite different from ours.
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higher if there are no revision opportunities. The biggest difference in fear of mis-
coordination is identified when we compare the baseline and the unilateral variation 
for strategies with (A,A) target ( 1−25훿
1−훿
 , see Table  6). Here we also see in our results 
that participants do use more cooperative machines in the unilateral variation com-
pared to the baseline variation (52 vs. 33%; p value = 0.019, see Table E.11) at least 
for strategic complements.
Fear of miscoordination is also higher for collusive strategies with complements 
than with substitutes. In particular, for strategies that target (A,A), the difference in 
fear of miscoordination between strategic complements and substitutes is 16 1
1−훿
 in 
the baseline condition and 16 under the unilateral variation. Thus, fear of miscoordi-
nation can also explain why revision opportunities (that decrease fear of miscoordi-
nation) have a bigger effect on the incidence of cooperative strategies under strategic 
complements compared to strategic substitutes.
Table 6  Fear of miscoordination F for the most used machines
Maximal regret is obtained if the opponent plays D–DDDD. The second column labeled “target” is the 
outcome on which the strategy aims to coordinate on. The maximal regret is computed relative to this 
target
Strategy Target Baseline Unilateral
Strat. subst. Strat. compl. Strat. subst. Strat. compl.
A–AAAA (A,A) 20 1
1−훿
36
1
1−훿
20 + 1 + 12
훿
1−훿
36 + 1 + 12
훿
1−훿
A–ABCC (A,A) 20 + 12 훿
1−훿
36 + 12
훿
1−훿
20 + 12
훿
1−훿
36 + 12
훿
1−훿
A–ABCD (A,A) 20 + 13 훿
1−훿
36 + 13
훿
1−훿
20 + 1 + 12
훿
1−훿
36 + 1 + 12
훿
1−훿
A–ACCC (A,A) 20 + 12 훿
1−훿
36 + 12
훿
1−훿
20 + 12
훿
1−훿
36 + 12
훿
1−훿
B–BBCC (B,B) 7 + 5 훿
1−훿
8 + 5
훿
1−훿
7 + 5
훿
1−훿
8 + 5
훿
1−훿
C–CCCC (C,C) 2 1
1−훿
2
1
1−훿
2
1
1−훿
2
1
1−훿
D–DCCC (C,C) 2 훿
1−훿
2
훿
1−훿
C–DCCC (C,C) 2 1
1−훿
2
1
1−훿
B–BCCC (C,C) 5 + 2 훿
1−훿
5 + 2
훿
1−훿
C–BCCC (C,C) 2 1
1−훿
2
1
1−훿
D–DDDD (D,D) 0 0 1 + (−1) 훿
1−훿
1 + (−1)
훿
1−훿
Footnote 20 (continued)
two constant streams of payoffs: 20 1
1−훿
 . In the unilateral treatment, the player again expects to receive 
a payoff of 43 every stage, but now is in the worst case able to adapt his strategy after realizing that the 
opponent did not use the same cooperative strategy. Then, the player receives a payoff of 23 in the first 
stage and continues to receive a payoff of 31 in all later stages. Taking into account the one unit cost for 
a modification of the machine, this situation renders the player a present value of 23 − 1 + 31 훿
1−훿
 . Hence, 
the fear of miscoordination is given by 43 1
1−훿
− (23 − 1 + 31
훿
1−훿
) = 20 + 1 + 12
훿
1−훿
 . The other numbers 
in the table are derived in a similar manner.
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4.4  Comparison to Potters and Suetens (2009)
Despite some design differences our result of greater collusion under strategic com-
plements than strategic substitutes in the presence of strategy revision opportuni-
ties replicates Potters and Suetens (2009)’s seminal finding.21Potters and Suetens 
(2009) explain their finding by suggesting that in response to a collusive move “best 
responding players will move in the same direction if choices are complements 
and in the opposite direction if choices are substitutes.” In other words, conditional 
on using for example myopic best responses, we should see more collusion under 
complements.
Our design allows us to also identify effects on intended strategies which tend to 
be more collusive under complements with revision opportunities (Sect. 3.3). The 
effect of revision opportunities on intended strategies can also explain why we find 
the opposite ranking than Potters and Suetens (2009) in the absence of strategy revi-
sion opportunities. Fewer cooperative strategies are used under strategic comple-
ments compared to strategic substitutes if revision opportunities are missing. This 
can, for example, be explained with fear of miscoordination as described in the pre-
vious subsection.
Finally, one can ask which environment (presence or absence of revision opportu-
nities) seems more relevant in applications. The answer to this question can depend, 
among others, on the attention the decision-maker gives to the interaction, whether 
there are organisational constraints that allow or impede quick revisions or whether 
human actors or computers (for example, price bots) execute a strategy. The impor-
tance of these factors in applications will determine whether they are best thought of 
as settings with or without strategy revision opportunities.
5  Conclusion
We have studied the effect of strategy revision opportunities on collusion in infi-
nitely repeated games and found that, while revision opportunities do not affect col-
lusion with strategic substitutes, they have a positive effect with strategic comple-
ments. The latter effect is strong enough that, although there is more collusion with 
21 The first main design difference is that we repeat the stage game indefinitely. Interestingly, Gül 
Mermer et  al. (2014) contest the robustness of the Potters and Suetens (2009) result in an indefinitely 
repeated games framework. They find that while on average there is not much difference between com-
plements and substitutes, the percentage of fully cooperative choices is significantly higher under sub-
stitutes. In contrast, analysis of Dal Bó and Fréchette (2018)’s meta-data on the indefinitely repeated 
prisoner’s dilemma game finds significantly more cooperation in strategic complements compared to 
strategic substitutes (controlling for discount factor, supergame and stage; see Embrey et  al. 2016, for 
details). The second main design difference is that we used a smaller choice set in the stage-games. 
Along with changing the salience of important stage-game actions, and potentially learning dynamics, 
the reduced action space allows us to hold some key marginal incentives constant: 휋Collusion , 휋Nash , but 
also 휋Dev and the corresponding sucker payoff (see Section  2.1). By contrast, the latter payoff differs 
across game types in Potters and Suetens (2009).
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substitutes if there are few or no revision opportunities, there is more collusion with 
complements if there are revision opportunities.
Our findings challenge received wisdom in the repeated game literature. This 
literature has largely ignored strategy revision opportunities due to the theoretical 
equivalence between behaviour strategies, which allow full flexibility during the 
course of play, and mixtures over strategies chosen at the start of the game are seen 
as equivalent in games of perfect recall. Our results show that revision opportunities 
matter, despite the fact that participants have a “large” strategy space available and 
could encode most standard behaviour strategies at the beginning of the game.
Our results could be of importance in a number of possible applications. Revision 
opportunities are often set by higher-level management and play an important role 
in the design of organizations. Managers at higher levels of an organization have 
to make day-to-day decisions on strategic oversight—that is, how much flexibility 
to give to lower-level management to make choices, or revise initially set strate-
gies, as market conditions unfold (Daily et  al. 2003). The extent to which corpo-
rations regulate franchises “top down” or allow revisions to, for example, pricing 
strategies is only one example of such decisions. Policy makers should also be con-
cerned about revision opportunities. Legal restrictions on meetings and agreements 
between market participants do affect the possibility of (orchestrated) strategy revi-
sions and potentially affect prices and competition in local markets (see, for exam-
ple, McCutcheon 1997). In some markets, including those for gasoline and ready-
mixed concrete, competitors are sometimes forced by authorities to announce their 
prices upfront, leaving little room for spontaneous price revisions. In some other 
markets computers (for example, price bots) are typically executing strategies and 
to which extent they are regulated differs across settings. Our findings suggest that 
in markets where competition exhibits strategic complementarity, any policy which 
complicates strategy revisions might have an additional preventative effect on col-
lusion. By contrast, such policies seem less likely to have an effect in a market of 
strategic substitutes. Future research could explore strategy revision in more applied 
designs to allow us to gain more insight into the importance of these questions in 
these applications.
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